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Abstract
Exchange rate targets in a stabilization gam e are considered. The 
targeting strategy consists on the choice of a desired level for the 
exchange and the w eight assigned to such target in the loss function. The 
exchange rate target appears then as an interm ediate objective and acts 
as a surrogate to policy coordination. The targeting solution reveals that 
the targeting strategy can be em bedded on a straight line in the policy- 
instrum ents space, w hich greatly facilitates the analysis. It turns out that 
the targeting strategy is optim al w hen  the reaction of the countries exert 
a positive externality on the other country. In this case, policym akers 
have som e flexibility in  the choice of the target as long as the optim al 
com m itm ent to such target is selected accordingly.
Keywords: policy coordination, exchange rate targets, optim al 
com m itm ent.
’-The author acknowledges the comments of Michael Artis, Mark Salmon and 























































































































































































This article deals with the design of exchange rate targets and their use as 
stabilizing device in the face of economic shocks. The actions of policymakers 
spillover to other countries in interdependent economies, hence the convenience of 
adopting a strategic game-theoretic setting. This is the standard approach in the 
policy coordination literature, where welfare considerations determine the gains 
from coordination. Players in the policy game only agree to follow a cooperative 
strategy if both gain with respect to the non-cooperative (Nash) outcome; in other 
words, the outcome from cooperation has to be incentive compatible.
Our approach is somehow different. In our model countries implicitly 
cooperate through a exchange rate arrangement. The exchange rate plays in this 
framework a role of intermediate target, but has no value on its own right. This 
idea is analogous to an optimal institutional contract, where both agents (countries) 
enjoy the same strategic position. The policymakers have to choose among a set 
of targeting strategies for the exchange rate the subset which provides the best 
outcome according to their policy objectives.
The optimal arrangement is defined by two conditions: incentive 
compatibility and Pareto optimality. Incentive compatibility turns out to be the 
necessary condition for the arrangement, otherwhise, private agents would realize 
the incentive to renege that a return to a non-cooperative equilibrium provides. The 
optimality condition just improves the virtue of the arrangement. Therefore, an 
incentive compatible target zone might turn out to be just a second best to explicit 
monetary policy coordination (which is Pareto optimal in the model we use here). 
We will also see that targeting the exchange rate may be counterproductive under 
certain circumstances.
The search for an optimal targeting strategy is developed in two stages. In 



























































































making it diverge from its equilibrium level; then we explore the possibility of 
targeting the exchange rate for the different types of shocks. This is formally done 
by delimiting the type of shocks for which the exchange rate arrangement is 
incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. It turns out that the feasibility of targeting 
the exchange rate depends on the type of shock.
The second stage directly tackles the question of designing optimal exchange 
rate targets within the relevant shock subset. We will observe that there is some 
scope for the discretion of the policymakers who can choose between a wide range 
of exchange rate targets, provided that they also choose the optimal commitment 
to the selected target.
All these questions are explored in detail in this article. Next section presents 
a flexible framework to generate the set of targeting strategies. This allows to 
consider both nominal and real exchange rate targets. Section II describes the 
model, originally developed by Canzoneri & //enderson (1991). The optimal 
targeting strategy is derived from the concepts of incentive compatibility and Pareto 
optimality defined in the third section. Section IV and V develop the two stages to 
targeting. The conclusions summarise our results and compare them with alternative 
proposals of exchange rate management and to the recent experience and future 
prospects of the EMS.
I-The exchange rate as intermediate target
We start by considering two identical and interdependent economies 
(subscripts 1,2) and their loss functions (L;,L2) defined so as to penalize the 
deviations of employment (n) and consumer prices (q) from their desired levels 
(superscript d). Deviations from the desired values imply welfare losses:






























































































The quadratic form and the arguments of these loss functions are standard 
in the policy coordination literature, pioneered by //amada (1976). Penalty values 
are normalized with respect to the weight of inflation in the loss function.
Each country is a player in this policy game. The policy instruments are 
given by the money supplies. When countries do not cooperate, they use their 
respective money supplies to minimize welfare losses, taking the actions of the 
other player as given. On the contrary, when countries explicitly cooperate, a 
common welfare function is jointly minimised.
The implications for the exchange rates differ, depending on the features of 
the model employed. In //amada’s deterministic environment, fixing the exchange 
rate mimics the efficient cooperative outcome; however, in a stochastic setting with 
rational expectations the conclusion is not so straightforward. In the //enderson 
model (1984), shifts in demand require the exchange rate to float while shifts in 
asset preferences advise the use of a peg; in the case of supply shocks, there is a 
conflict between the preferences of the players. The Canzoneri-//enderson (1991) 
model which we use here, highlights- in the case of symmetric supply shocks- the 
need for a leader to determine the money supply and a follower who pegs the 
exchange rate, yielding an asymmetric arrangement. In general (see Gemberg 
(1989)), cooperation in the exchange rate management pays depending on the 
nature of shocks.
The diversity of results suggests that it is advisable to adopt a flexible 
approach to exchange rate targeting, in which the different alternatives are 
considered. The ERM and Bretton Woods regimes targeted the nominal exchange 
rate around a narrow band while the Williamson (1985) proposal advocated 
maintaining the real exchange rate around a predetermined level; in this case, the 
band was loosely defined. The ’Program for Monetary coordination’ proposed by 
McKinnon (1984) suggested an agreement on the global money supply to maintain 
exchange rates fixed. This global money supply had then to be allocated between 
countries, on the basis of a price stability target.
The central role of the exchange rate in the practice of policy coordination 
emphasises the value of exchange rate targets as surrogates for explicit policy 




























































































’...governments are prone to cheat and will not engage in optimal coordination 
because they cannot trust each other. A government cannot cheat on a firm 
commitment to exchange rate pegging without being caught. Therefore exchange 
rate pegging is viewed as a viable alternative to full-fledged coordination ’ (Kenen 
(1989), p.54).
Notwithstanding this, in the policy coordination literature the choice of the 
exchange rate usually appears as a by-product of the coordination solution and it 
is not explicitly considered. Nevertheless, a strand of this literature (see //ughes 
//allet et. al (1989) and, in particular, //ughes //allet (1993)) has explicitly included 
exchange rate targets in the policymakers optimization problem. We can justify this 
inclusion more formally using an analogy with the optimal contract literature, 
adapted to the context of policy coordination.
This literature has its origin in the credibility problem of monetary policy 
pointed out by Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983). Their 
contribution revealed the utility of setting up rules for the management of policy 
to which the monetary authority (principal) has to commit to cancel the inflationary 
bias in agents expectations. Barro and Gordon underlined the incentive to cheat on 
these rules, due to time inconsistency. This incentive problem was addressed by 
Rogoff (1985) which highlighted that it could be overcome if monetary policy was 
entrusted to the Central Bank through some kind of institutional provision regarding 
some intermediate target (optimal contract). If the commitment to the rule could 
be achieved, the incentive to renege would be eliminated1.
In our case the contract is specified in terms of exchange rate targets, for the 
reasons we have mentioned above. Two sovereign countries decide to commit to 
an exchange rate arrangement if they are expected to gain from it; that is, the 
incentive problem is redefined here in terms of incentive compatibility. Note that 
principal-agent considerations are no central here. The behaviour of the agents is 
guided from their rational expectations and both players are on an equal strategic 
footing. Reneging on the arrangement opens the possibility of retaliation by the 
second country and the suspension of an agreement which is benefitial for both 
countries. Therefore the incentive to renege is eliminated.
'-Later works refined these ideas and orientated the research to the design of institutional 




























































































The contract (V) is appended to the optimizing problem of the countries. 
Since the countries are equal from an strategic point of view, the contract is the 




The contract is defined in terms of the real exchange rate (z) and enters in 
the optimizing problem with a weight p. More precisely, we propose a contract of 
the following form:
v=y2p(z- / )2
Countries agree on the contract at the beginning of the period in order to 
minimise the welfare loss derived from unanticipated shocks. The values of p and 
Z* should be chosen so as to induce the optimal response o f policymakers to attain 
their final goals: inflation and unemployment. Therefore, the exchange rate is an 
intermediate target in the modified loss functions (W„ W2), but it is not a final goal 
itself.
Following Rogoff (1985) we can define the parameter or weight (1 as the 
optimal degree of commitment to the intermediate target, in this case the exchange 
rate. The parameter P is constrained to be positive, otherwise what is being targeted 
is the exchange rate to avoid!. If p were equal to zero, no constraint is imposed on 
the exchange rate and the result corresponds to the non-cooperative free-float 
solution.
The second element to define is the the choice of the exchange rate target 
{zf). How do players agree on the desired level for the real exchange rate?. The 
exchange rate target in our model is inspired by the exchange rate arrangements 
mentioned above, especially on the nominal ERM regime and the Williamson 
proposal. The singularity of our approach is the consideration of a continuum of 
exchange rate targets, which spans between both alternatives. This setup allows for 




























































































question of exchange rate targeting.
The ERM and Williamson’s proposal have in common the choice of a target 
exchange rate which is allowed to fluctuate within a band. If rigidity is defined 
with respect to the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of Purchasing Power Parity, 
they represent the polar choices of a rigid system with ’hard’ bands and a flexible 
regime with ’soft’ bands, respectively. This suggests the use of an approach which 
incorporates both of these proposals as special cases, which can be formalised as 
follows2.
Let us take the real exchange rate (2) identity, in terms of purchasing power
parity:
z=e-(p,-p2)
where p  is the price level, the subscripts denote countries one and two respectively 
and the nominal exchange rate e, is defined as the price of country 2 currrency in 
terms of country 1 currency.
The ERM regime aims at maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate parity, 
i.e. ed=0. Substituting above, we observe that this is equivalent to a real exchange 
rate target equal to the negative of price differentials:
*‘=-(PrP2)-
The Williamson target zone on the contrary implies a desired value for the 
real exchange rate equal to zero /= () or, equivalently, a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate equal to the price differentials:
ed=(PrP2>-
Let us now define the parameter p, such that ed=(l-p)(pl-p2). Note that (1-p) 
represents then the degree which the nominal exchange rate target offsets price
2- Since positive values of (3 penalize deviations from the desired values, it represents 
a soft band of fluctuation for the desired exchange rate target; the larger the value of (3, the 
narrower will be the implied band. This specification allows us to think of the targeting 




























































































differentials. Thus, we can write the exchange rate target in general form as a 
function of the price differentials
z d=ed-(pr p 2h - p ( p r p j  P]
It immediately follows that p=7 corresponds to a nominal exchange rate 
target, as in the ERM regime and p=0 corresponds to the Williamson target zone, 
that is, a real exchange rate target. As p moves away from zero the desired 
exchange rate partially accomodates inflation differentials. These intermediate 
values present special interest because they provide flexibility in the choice of 
exchange rate target, according to the preferences of policymakers.
We can observe that the design of the targeting strategy is determined by the 
choice of just two parameters: p and (3. The first specifies the extent to which the 
real exchange rate is the target and the second determines the degree of 
commitment to such a target. We will refer to them as target parameters. The 
range of parameters is constrained to positive values of (3 and to values of p 
between zero and one, i.e. between real and nominal exchange rate targets.
Countries can choose among a wide combination of exchange rate targets 
and values for (3, which represent the set of targeting strategies. This set, denoted 
as X can be formally defined as:
W /p jfp /, V |3>0, Ozpzl}
In this way we have a very simple and general method to explore whether 
targeting the exchange rate pays when countries are placed on an equal strategic 
footing. When the answer is in the affirmative, our specification will be able to 
determine which is the optimal targeting strategy within the set. Prior to this, we 
have still to develop the economic model of reference and to define the concepts 
which will be used in the formal analysis. This is done in the two next sections.
II-The model
In this section we present the Canzoneri & f/enderson (1988,1991) two- 
country model of symmetric monetary economies. These economies are subject to 




























































































assumed, so that only unanticipated shocks can affect equilibrium. The 
disaggregation of shocks and the treatment of the exchange rates introduce some 
minor modifications into the Canzoneri-Henderson model.
Two countries are considered, each producing a different good with the 
corresponding subscripts. All the variables except the interest rates are expressed 
in logs and represent deviations of actual values from equilibrium. Symmetry holds 
in the strong sense that all the parameters are the same in both countries (for the 
exchanges rates they have opposite signs).
The output of each country (yi i=l,2 where the subscript i refers to the 
variable in each country) is obtained through a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
It is an increasing function of domestic employment n: and it decreases when some 
adverse supply shock x \, hits the economy:
yi=(l-<*)n,-x’,
y2=(l-a)n2-x’2
For convenience we present the next table presents the values and definitions 
of the parameters appearing in the model and those derived from the 
transformations which follow.
Par. Definition Range
1- a Labour coefficient in the production function 0<1-OL<1
£ Marginal propensity to spend 0< E <1
ô Effect of exchange rate in demand 0<b<l
V Interest rate elasticity 0<\<1
ç Share of import goods in domestic basket 0<X,<Vt
Y Y =[2b+(l-2Q2\]-' 0<y<l
Ç ç=l-(l-2t)e 0<ç<l





























































































VT) \/i1 = 7a+<l)T' 0 <7 t]<7 1
e <x> II 0 <Q<‘/ f y
Firms hire labour up to the point in which real wages equal the marginal 
product of labour:
w ^ ^ -a r i j - x ’, 
w2-p2=-an2-x'2
where wt and p, are nominal wages and prices, respectively. We can assume that 
the supply shocks take the form of adverse labour productivity shocks. Contracts 
are signed at the beginning of each period, so that shocks are unanticipated. These 
contracts specify nominal wages and employment rules and workers agree to supply 
whatever quantity of labour firms want at the nominal wage specified in the 
contracts.




The market equilibrium conditions for the demands of goods are: 
y 1-5z+(l-Q E y1+£ey2- ( l-£ )v r r pvr2+u'1 
y2=-6z+£sy,+(l-£)ey2-p v r1- ( l-£ )v r2+u'2
where r, are the real interest rates and u, stand for positive demand shocks. 
Uncovered interest parity holds, so that r,-r2=zc-z. The superscript stands for 
expected value.




Nominal wages are set as follows. From the output and the wages equations 
above, and using the money market equilibrium equations, employment can be 





























































































Firms and workers choose the nominal wage that minimises the expected 
square deviations of employments from the full-employment value, set equal to 
zero. Optimizing the square of the expression above, we observe that the respective 






The reduced forms are obtained by expressing all the variables of interest in 
terms of the instruments and the shocks. The expressions for the employments are 
straightforward:
n2=m2-m2e
The expressions for the consumer price indexes require several steps. First, 
we solve for the output prices and then for the exchange rates. The output prices 
expression is straightforward. Substituting the equilibrium values for nominal wages 
and the expression for employment in the product prices, we can express them in 
reduced form as:
P r m i+( a - 1X '«,-«i,)+*',;
p 2-m 2+(a-l)(m2-m 2)+x'r
To obtain the reduced form for the real exchange rate, we note first that the 
sum of excess demands must be zero. Substracting the expressions for the demand 
for goods, we obtain
-?(y1-3'2)+26z- ( 1- 25)v (r r r2)+M! 'M2=o
Using the equations for the real exchange rate and the uncovered interest 
parity, the real interest differential from this expression is given by:
rr r2=(l-2t)(z'-z)
Substituting this value above and eliminating y,-y2 with the help of the 
output expressions, we obtain the reduced form for the real exchange rate:




























































































In this expression, we can reasonably assume that the expected real exchange 
rate is equal to zero (z?=0). On the one hand, the expected values of the 
disturbances is zero; on the other hand, since nominal wages and prices are 
perfectly flexible, the expected real exchange rate is independent of today’s money 
supply. Finally, the existence of an exchange rate target does not influence ’a 
priori’ exchange rate expectations, because they are only binding in the case of 
shocks.
The expression for the consumer price indexes is obtained by direct 
substitution:
^2=m2 <t)(mi-m,')+(<|>+a-lX'M2-m2':)+ (l~x)x'2+xx[+t,y(u[-u'2).
Finally, in the appendix is shown that the expected money supplies are zero. 
The shocks are redefined as follows
jc,=vrpr,’ and ui= \rfyu i’, i=l,2
and the reduced forms for the variables of interest take the following form:
nx=mx ; n2=m2
<7r(/n ) 1[/n,-20w2+(l-x)x1+TA:2-(ur M2)]
[3]
<72=(\AT~) 1K - 2 0 w ,+(1-t )x2+x x 1+(m1- m2)] 
p = a m ^(Jy \~ ) p2-cun2+ ( s j ) '*2
The implications of the model are well-known. A domestic monetary 
expansion positively affects domestic employment and prices and negatively affects 
foreign prices; adverse supply shocks (x,>0) reduce domestic output and increase 
domestic consumer prices through the increase in the price of the domestic good. 
Positive demand shocks in country one (u,>0) push domestic consumer prices 
down because of the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate induced by the 





























































































e= [a+ 5 7 (l-a )](w ,-w ^ + /rrT(-*i-^2)-(^\Ai—) ‘( « r “2)
Z=S Y )  '[x(jc1- x2)+(«i-« 2)]
Finally, it is also convenient to write the real exchange rate target derived 
from the correction mechanism derived in the previous sections. Substituting terms 
we obtain:
2 i - -p [a ( /n | -m 2)+(vTl )~l(xr xJ] 
z - z ‘i=[pa+g7 (l-a )](/n 1-m 2)+(\/ri )
From these expressions, it would be easy to derive the desired exchange rate 
in the face of a shock, other things being equal. However, shocks also affect the 
policy goals and countries react to them using their policy instruments to stabilize 
the economy around the desired levels. For instance, in the face of the asymmetric 
demand shock considered above, the domestic country has an incentive to inflate 
and the foreign country an incentive to disinflate. The resulting exchange rate is 
the result of both influences and consequently the desired exchange rate value 
(determined by the choice of p) has to be chosen so as to induce the optimal 
response of both countries, to stabilise the economy for any given shocks. This is 
the issue to be explored in the remainder of the paper.
Ill-Incentive compatibility and Pareto optimality
In this section we define the conditions to derive optimal targeting 
strategies. They are encompassed by in the requirements of sustainability and 
optimality. However, before reaching a formal definition we need to make use of 
other related concepts which are now presented.
The derivation of the model allows us to substitute the reduced forms [4,5] 
in the modified loss functions. Assuming that the desired inflation and 
unemployment levels are set equal to zero (nf=0, qf=0,i=l,2.), the expression to 































































































W1=L1 + y = i{o (/n 1)2+[/w,-20/n2+(l-x)x:1+TA:2-(tt1-M2)]2+ 
+ P[VP' (m]~m2)+ P~x/^ (xr x2)-  ■ l  {ur u2) f}
W2=L2+ V=-i{o(m2)2+[/n2-20/n]+(l-x)x2+Tx1+(M1-M2)]2+
+P[Vp' (m1-m2) + £ l ^ ( x 1-x2)-_ l_ (M i-U 2 )]2}
£ /n
[7]
where \Jp' = pa+ 5v(l_ a )
The introduction of a exchange rate target in the optimization problem 
implies that the exchange rate target acts as an indirect cooperation device. It is 
indirect because the optimization problem facing each country is equivalent to the 
non-cooperative case; each country maximizes its welfare with respect to its 
instrument, taking as given the actions of the foreign country, but also taking into 
account the common exchange rate:
aw,
_ _ = 0  =>/?,: mr tl), {tl>2m2-[(l-x)+ (p--)]tl)3x1 + [(p-i)-x)]tl)3x2+tlt4(Mr M2)}
om] *=> *
dW,
— =0 =>R2: m2=r|), {ip2/w1-[(l-x)+(p--)]H )3x2+[(p--)-x]tl)3x1-'tl)4(M1- M ^
where rj^ l+ cr+ P p '; ip j-^ + P p ';  ip3= P /p ^
/ T  ’
The points where the reaction functions (R i ,R 2)  intersect represent the 
targetting solutions. The reaction functions and the rest of concepts defined in this 
section are represented in figures 1 and 2, below. We operate in the [ml,m2] space, 
where the ellipses are isoclines of the loss functions and the reaction functions are 
represented by straight lines.
The solutions depend on the parameters of the model, the shocks and the 
values of the target parameters; while the two former are taken as given, the latter 
are chosen by the authorities in some optimal way to be defined.
The choice of the target parameters in the strategy set induce a set of 
targeting equilibria which can be specified as a function of X, T(k)={mIr,m2r}, 





























































































T [^,(l-T)+ip2T:]jc1 + [tl>1T+tl>2(l-T)]x2 [(p-x/Ç)(a4J2-t|)|)i|)J(jc1-jc2)
m. --------------------------------------------------- +-------------------------------------+
^-n>2
 ̂ [^ (^ r% )K » |
T [^ , ( l - t )  + ̂ 2T:k 2+[H,1T:+^2(1- T)]j:1 [(P-'C/Ç)(^2-^i>liJ3](;ïr ;C2)m2= ---------------------------------------------  -----------------------------------
^ 1 -^ 2  rô-n»*
i-^»2)](“ , -  “2)
^ î-^ 2
It is important to explore the characteristics of the targeting solutions because 
they will be crucial to derive the next propositions. We show in the appendix that 
the set of targeting solutions is a straight line (target line, hereafter); More 
formally, it is claimed that:
Proposition 1: The set of targeting equilibria, T(k), is contained in a 
straight line with slope equal to -1 in the [mltm2j space, where:
7'(X):{(w17,mJ) I mj=
l+ a-2 0
r,-/n, } [ 10]
One particular point of this line refers to the case in which the exchange 
rate is not targeted, i.e (3=0, V p. This is of course the Nash non-cooperative 
solution N=T(0)={miN,m2N} of our model3 *. In this case, where ty,=f+o, ip,=20, 
rp(=0, rpj=i. it is straightforward to see by direct substitution into [9] that:




N [(1+o )(1-t )+20t ]jc2+[20(1-x )+(1 + o )x ]x 1+(1+o -20)(u1- m2)
m: -  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(l+o)2-(20)2
The set of incentive compatible solutions or bargaining area (A) is defined
3-See Canzoneri & Henderson (1991,pgs.21 and 37). They only consider symmetric
supply shocks (x,=x2) and opposite demand shocks (u,/2=-u2/2). Substituting in [11] we




























































































as the set of points which are Pareto superior to the Nash solution:
A:{\/mvm2 \ Wl(mvm2)<.Wl{m",m") , W2(m ,,m2) s W2(m? jn 2 )
The explicit cooperative solution is obtained by the minimization of the 
weighted joint loss function, with (3=0, such that WC=Z.C,where 8,7-8 are the 
weights assigned to each country:
L c-8 L 1+(1-8)L2
The contract curve (C(b)) is obtained by minimizing this loss function with 
respect to each instrument, and setting the rate of marginal substitution equal to 
minus one dm2/dml\dL̂ 0=-l, so as to fulfill the condition of Pareto optimality:
/-vs \ r c c \ dLc dLc C(6): { /n, ,m2 I ---- ---------- - =*>
dm | dm2
= £  ,/M1-20/n2+8[(l-T>c]+TJc2]-(l-6 )20[(l-T )x2+Tx1]-  [12]
- ( 8 +(l-8)20X «r «2)-
- - [ 2 2»M2-20ffi1-620[(l-T )x1+xx2]-(l-8)[(l-T )r:2+Tx1] +
+(620+(1-8))(m1- m2)] }
where 2 ,=8 (l+o)+ (l-8)(20)2; 2 2=(l-8 )(l+ o )+ 6  (20)2
Setting 8=7, (6=0), the instruments of both countries are chosen to maximize 




Since the bliss points corresponds to zero welfare losses, B„B2 are placed 
at the center of the respective ellipses.
Finally, it is convenient to define the segment which joins the bliss points 
as the bliss line (B). Taking the expressions for the bliss points, it is straightforward 
to derive the following segment:
, (l-xjx.+xx,
































































































Effect of supply shocks. Opposite shocks
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Figure 2.b-Strategic behaviour and  idiosyncratic supply shocks




























































































The only novel concept among the above definitions is the set of targeting 
equilibria derived from the exchange rate arrangement. Since we have shown that 
this set is embedded in the target line, we can conveniently make use of the latter 
to specify the sustainability and optimality of the targeting strategy.
Recall that, in general, incentive compatible strategies must be Pareto 
superior to the Nash solution, that is, they have to belong to the bargaining area. 
Therefore a target strategy will be incentive compatible if it lies on the target line 
that passes through the bargaining area:
SUSTAINABILITY CONDITION
[14]
3 > J r(* .y u * {0 }
Similarly Pareto optimal strategies are placed on the contract curve of 
cooperative solutions C(&). Therefore the targeting strategy will be Pareto optimal 




It could be the case that there is no possible means to design a Pareto 
optimal strategy which is sustainable or, viceversa, an incentive compatible strategy 
which is Pareto optimal. Note that the first situation would preclude the 
arrangement; on the contrary, an incentive compatible strategy which is not Pareto 
optimal could be accepted because incentive compatibility is a sufficient condition. 
Nevertheless in this latter case, it should be convenient to contemplate some 
complementary criterion (suboptimality criterion) to achieve the most efficient 
targeting strategy which is sustainable; for instance, the sustainable targeting 
equilibrium which minimizes the distance to the contract curve point.
Considering both conditions jointly and taking into account the suboptimality 
criterion, the optimal targeting strategy (or optimal contract) can be defined as 
follows:
X‘|r(X*)={/W|‘,/n2"}





























































































or, in the case that the Pareto optimal criterion cannot be fulfilled:
{/n,',/n2‘} = {»!,',mj GA |min(<#sf[A,C(&)])} , if T(k)f)C(b)(fA [17]
IV-Economic shocks and optimal targets
Supply and demand shocks have different effects on welfare as an inspection 
of [6,7] reveals. Consequently, the scope for targeting may crucially depend on the 
type and magnitude of the shock hitting the economy. In this section we formally 
analyse the possibility of designing an optimal targeting strategy for the two 
different types of shocks we are considering. The results take the form of 
propositions whose proofs appear in the appendix. We will apply the above 
conditions when the shocks arise on the demand side and on the supply side: first, 
we will explore incentive compatibility, then optimality and finally the joint 
hypothesis.
It is important to keep in mind that in this section we focus on the whole 
target line, without any constraint on the target parameters. 7/owever, in the next 
section we will restrict the relevant subset of target strategies, which corresponds 
to positive values of (3 and p between zero and one4.
Figures 1 and 2 give a flavour of the results in this section. They represent 
the concepts defined above in the [m ^m j space when different types of shocks hit 
the economy. We consider the case of symmetric (xl=x2), idiosyncratic 
(x,>x2=0,uI>u2=0) and opposite (x,=-x2,ul=-u2) shocks. From the observation of 
the reduced forms [4,5], we can see that symmetric demand shocks (u,-u2) have no 
effect whatsoever on the economy.
Figure 1 suggests the feasibility of a targeting strategy in the case of 
demand shocks and advances the conclusions of the formal analysis below. An
4-Therefore, strictly speaking the propositions below are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for targeting the exchange rate appropiately. Only when the value of of the 
targeting parameters are specified, the propositions will be completed. In the next section 
we will focus in more detail on the conditions for which p is positive when p is between 
zero and one. Nevertheless, we can anticipate that for demand shocks positive p can always 




























































































opposite demand shock can be interpreted as a shift in demand from one to another 
country (from country two to country one if u, is positive) and an idiosyncratic 
shock may be the result of an expansionary fiscal policy in any of the countries.
The plot shows that the target line crosses the bargaining area (A) and the 
contract curve (C(5)) for both asymmetric and idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests 
that a incentive compatible and Pareto optimal targeting strategy can be specified. 
This intuition is confirmed by the formal analysis of the model, which is carried 
out in the appendix. The results can be summed up in the following three 
propositions:
Proposition 2: For demand shocks of any type or magnitude, there exists at 
least one exchange rate arrangement which is incentive compatible.
Proposition 3: For demand shocks of any type or magnitude, there exists one 
Pareto optimal exchange rate arrangement.
Proposition 4: For demand shocks o f any type or magnitude, the Pareto 
optimal exchange rate arrangement is incentive compatible and corresponds to the 






The two first results are linked by proposition four which shows that 
whatever the demand shock, the targeting equilibrium which intersects the contract 
curve belongs to the bargaining area, so that the Pareto optimal equilibrium is also 
incentive compatible. Therefore demand shocks present no problem for the 
design of optimal targeting strategies.
The question is not so straightforward as in the case of supply shocks. The 
different plots of figure 2.a-c display a quite different picture: only in the case of 
opposite supply shocks, does the target line cross A and C(8).
We can interpret an opposite supply shock as a shift in productivity from one 
country to another, due, for instance to the transfer of a industry from one country 




























































































may be due to price shocks on raw materials used to produce both goods (typically 
an oil shock); if the shock only affects the production of one good, the case of an 
idiosyncratic supply shock would arise.
The mathematical analysis of the appendix shows that the case for targeting 
is not general in the case of supply shocks. As before, we can convey the result in 
three propositions:
Proposition 5: For supply shocks at least one incentive compatible exchange 
rate target will exists if
(1+o)-(1+o -20)t v^v.<. 20+(1+o -20)t
20+(l+o-20)x X ' ^ X ‘ &  (1 + a ) -( l+ a -2 0 ) t X p
Vx>0 i j - 1 , 2 »
Proposition 6: For supply shocks there exists an optimal exchange rate 
target only if
(1+o)-(1+o -20)t---—— ---------- —X.SXS-
20+(l + a-20)x ' '
20+(1+o -20)t
(l+a)-(l+cr-20)x
xr Vx>0 ( > 1 , 2 »
Proposition 7: For opposite supply shocks (x ^ -x j ,  the Pareto optimal 
exchange rate arrangement is incentive compatible and corresponds to the point
C(V2):
Vxr  -x2=#C(i)- {ml ,m l} ETfk)
. (1+20)(1-2t )x1 . [19]
m, — --------------------- -  ~m->
[a+( 1+20)2]
From propositions five and six, it follows that the existence of sustainable 
or Pareto optimal targeting strategies is restricted to a range of shocks determined 
by the values of the rest of the parameters of the model. The parameters 0 and x 
are positive and less than V2 (see table) and o  is positive. Therefore, it is 
straightforward to show that
(l+ o )-( l+ a -2 0 )x <  ̂ 20+(l+a-20)x > ^




























































































and consequently x ,=-x2 always belongs to this range. The implications of this 
result are the following:
-Idiosyncratic and symmetric supply shocks (figures 2.b,c) preclude the 
design of incentive compatible or Pareto optimal targeting strategies.
-A necessary condition for the exchange rate arrangement to be incentive 
compatible is that the shocks are of opposite sign.
-In particular, opposite shocks (figure 2.a) allow for incentive compatible 
targeting strategies, for a range of parameters to be determined in the next section.
Furthermore, proposition seven states that only in the case of opposite supply 
shocks is the existence of an incentive compatible strategy which is Pareto optimal 
attainable. For the rest of the cases in the relevant range we have had to proceed 
by numerical simulation. The outcome depends on the values of o  and 0. In 
particular, for values close to the extremes of the range the Pareto optimal point 
does not fall within the bargaining area. In any case, for these latter situations, the 
suboptimality criterion indicated above (see expression [17]) can be applied and 
the incentive compatible targeting equilibrium which minimizes the distance to the 
contract curve point would be chosen.
Interpretation of the results
Note that in our model the cases for which a targeting strategy is feasible 
have some features in common. Comparison of figure 1 (demand shocks) with 
figure 2.c (opposite supply shocks) actually reveals an equivalent outcome in 
graphical terms. Note that in both cases, the money supplies have different signs, 
that is, when one country reacts by expanding and the other by contracting the 
money supply in the face of a shock, there is scope for an optimal targeting 
strategy. This suggests the following claim:
Proposition 8: The necessary condition for the existence of a incentive






























































































This conjecture is proved in the appendix. The economic significance of this 
result is quite clear: when the reaction of one country exerts a positive externality, 
that is, when the Nash response induce a move of the exchange rate in the same 
direction, there is scope for an optimal exchange rate strategy.
The magnitude of the desired exchange rate change is what differs between 
countries; for instance, in the case of a positive global demand shock (u,-u2>0), the 
individual effort to depreciate the exchange rate is too cautious when countries act 
non-cooperatively and it will result in an insufficient depreciation, yielding an 
inefficient outcome, //owever, the joint effort to depreciate derived from the 
targeting strategy will induce an optimal outcome.
Note that this implies a more activist role for monetary policy derived from 
the targeting strategy. Comparing the expressions for the Nash solution in [11] and 
the optimal targeting strategy for demand and opposite supply shocks (expressions 
[18] and [19] respectively), we can express the latter as a function of the Nash 
solution; it turns out that:
N  |
I’
(l-2x  )xi+uj-uj 




w ,v|<(l -2t )x + -u
J [20]
This result shows that the optimal strategy will always imply a larger change 
in the money supply, both for the expansionary and the deflationary country. This 
result is confirmed by the graphical analysis where we can observe that, in the 
relevant figures, the optimal solution is more distant from the origin than the Nash 
solution.
Finally, the slope of the target line being equal to -1 implies that the global 
money supply does not change when the solution shifts from the Nash to the 
targeting equilibrium. More formally, the expression for the target line in [10] 
shows that at the targeting equilibrium the global money supply remains constant 
and equal to the Nash solution. For supply shocks
mI+m2=-(l-2T)(x,+x2)/(l+o+2Q) 
and for demand shocks the global money supply is simply zero.
Thus, the effect of the targeting strategy is to allocate more efficiently a 
given global money supply than in a non-cooperative situation, which is a 




























































































V-The design of optimal targeting strategies
Up to now, we have shown the feasibility of designing optimal targeting 
strategies. Once the set of possible shocks has been determined, attention can be 
shifted to the more concrete issue of designing optimal contracts.
As a matter of fact, the analysis of the previous section is incomplete unless 
the characteristics of the target line in the bargaining area are determined. The 
position on the target line depends on the target parameters p,p. In principle, they 
are independent parameters which are chosen at the discretion of policymakers, but 
the range of values that each of them can take is constrained. The parameter p, 
which determines the desired exchange rate target is bounded between real and 
nominal exchange rate targets and (3, the optimal commitment to the desired 
exchange rate target, must be positive5. Thus, the feasible range for the parameters 
are:
Ospsf; p>0
We will first explore the conditions to obtain a positive degree of 
commitment, for the considered range of exchange rate targets and then we will 
specify the relationship between them.
Let us recall first that the quadratic optimization solution minimizes 
deviations from the desired targets; hence, when p is positive, it is obvious that the 
new solution must reduce the deviation from the now binding exchange rate target 
relative to the Nash solution, where the exchange rate is not targeted.
Therefore, comparing the effects of a particular exchange rate target at the 
optimal solution with the Nash solution determines the existence of a positive value 
for p. More precisely if
l(z-zrf)A1>l(z-zd)1=*p>0 [21]
and vice versa. The appendix shows that
5-From [5],The exchange rates and the targets are defined with respect to one country. 
Countries one and two have then to be labelled, depending on the type of shocks, such that 
a nominal exchange rate target correspond to p=l, not to p=-/ (the nominal exchange rate 




























































































Proposition 9: In the case of demand shocks, the degree o f commitment is 
positive for both nominal and real exchange rate targets, that is,
V 0<sp*;l =sl(z-2‘')wl>l(z-z'i)"l=tp>0 [22]
Proposition 10: In the case of opposite supply shocks, targeting the real 
exchange rate is counterproductive (p=0 implies fi<0), while a nominal exchange 
rate target may be appropriate. More precisely
V p s p ------------- —------------ >0 =tl(z-zrf)A1>l(z-z‘0 ,l=^>O [23]
1+20 + 0 /(1 + 2 6 )-^ ;^
Thus, for demand shocks the existence of a feasible targeting strategy is 
confirmed, while existence is not clear for opposite supply shocks because p+ may 
indeed be larger than one6. Note that expression [23] imposes an additional 
condition on the existence of an optimal targeting strategy (with positive (3) in 
addition to the conditions derived in the previous section. Targeting the real 
exchange rate (p=0) is therefore discarded for supply shocks, because p+ is strictly 
positive.
The optimal degree of commitment (p*) to the exchange rate target is the 
value of P which attains an optimal solution for a given value of p. The previous 
expressions have shown that the sign of |3 depends on the value p. This suggests 
that the optimal degree of commitment (P’) can be expressed as a function of the 
exchange rate target and the structural parameters of the economy: p’=/(p,.). Two 
of these parameters are particularly important: the weight given to the employment 
objective (a) and the degree of openness of the economy (t).
The function f(p,.) can be obtained as follows. The optimal money supplies 
in the cases of demand and opposite supply shocks must belong to the target 
solution which appears in [9]. Noting that x ,--x 2 and
(tl>,-tp2)/(tp/-ip/ ) =1 +0+29 +2pp ’
6- In particular,we will see below that low levels of goods market integration (low £) 
would make even nominal exchange rates (p=l) inappropiate. For low values of a , a similar 




























































































Figure 3.a-Dem and shocks. Optim al com m itm ent for a  given exchange  rate target 




Figure 3.b-Dem and shocks. Optim al com m itm ent for a  given e xchange  rate target 




























































































Figure 4.a-Supply shocks. O ptim al com m itm ent for a  g iven e xch ang e  rate target when 
the deg ree  of integration varies.
Share of Correction of central parityimport goods 0.5 g
Figure 4.b-Supply shocks, Optim al com m itm ent for a  g iven e xch an g e  rate target when 




























































































it f o l lo w s  that:
.| — — [ ( « - « ) —( l - 2 x ) x . ] -  
c  [a+(l+20)2] LV 1 2
_ (1 + PvP'  /(^vrj ))(« ,-m2)-[(1 -2 t )+2P(p - t /^)v,p / /yil ]x t 
1 +a+20+2pp'
Considering each shock separately, we can equate both terms to solve for |3', 
for a given value of p:
a20yr|
vp^[(l+20)2+a)-2+Cvrr~ (l+20)vp ^  ]
Vxr -x2 , p • - _______________ (l-2T)o20/rj _______________
2VpM(p -T /?((l+20)2 *S+a ) - vr r (U 2 0 ) ( l - 2 T V p ^ ]
is the general expression for the optimal degree of commitment to a given 
optimal targeting strategy, taking into account the parameter constraints given 
above.
Given the complexity of the expression, it is helpful to plot f(p,.) for the 
most relevant parameters: /(p,t,.j, f(p,a,.). Figures 3,4.a and 3,4,b. display the 
weight assigned to the exchange rate target relative to the weight attached to the 
other final targets for different values of X, and a, respectively7. The value of p‘ 
corresponds to the optimal targeting strategy; recalling that the Nash solution 
corresponds to p*=0, all the values between zero and p are also incentive 
compatible, albeit suboptimal and corresponding to the segment of the target line 
between the Nash point and the contract curve in the figures 1 and 2s.
Note that f(p,.) is continuous for demand shocks, but for opposite supply 
shocks it presents a discontinuity at p=p+ (the vertical plane in the figures); for 
values of p lower than p+ would imply a negative p’, precluding the possibility of 
targeting the exchange rate.
7-More precisely, the weight is normalized relative to the unemployment penalty . In
figure 3 and 4 (a) a=l; however, but figures (b) the optimal degree of commitment is
expressed as p/a and the weight attached to the to the price objective is 1/a otherwise.
S-Actually, there is also a range of values above p" for which the target zone is also
sustainable. This range corresponds to the segment of the target line between the contract




























































































It may also be interesting to comment briefly the consequences of changes 
in the relevant parameters for the targeting strategy. The derivatives of (5 with 




Supply shocks('d^> >0) 
do
The effects of the level of market integration (£) on the targeting strategy are 
different, depending on the type of shocks. We already mentioned that low and 
medium values of ’C, preclude exchange rate targets in the case of opposite supply 
shocks. For demand shocks, we observe that higher levels of integration which 
increase the spillover effects call for tighter exchange rate targets (larger (I), as 
intuition suggests.
The parameter o-the weight assigned to the employment goal- has equivalent 
effects for both cases. Let us note from [6,7] that the unemployment goal penalizes 
any deviation of the money supplies from zero. Since the optimal policy is more 
activist than the Nash solution, an increase in a  will reduce the need for targeting.
A first apparent result is that in the case of demand shocks (Fig 3,a.b) the 
emphasis on targeting is less than that on the final goals in L,,L2; this seems 
reasonable, given that the exchange rate is an intermediate objective,. For opposite 
supply shocks this is also the general result, although for values of t, close to the 
discontinuity term, we find p*>7.
Another interesting feature of the outcome is that it depends on the type of 
shock affecting the economy, but not on the magnitude nor the sign of the shocks. 
This is a result which is also found in the existing policy coordination literature, 
and it greatly facilitates the design of the optimal contract. As a matter of fact, for 
any demand shock the formula above can be applied; for supply shocks, we already 
know that only in certain cases will it be possible to find an optimal targeting 
strategy. In this case, the corresponding expression can be applied. Otherwise, an 




























































































The third and most relevant conclusion of this analysis is that there is not an 
unique optimal design for the exchange rate target. Although the optimal degree of 
commitment is determined by [24], it ultimately depends on the definition of the 
optimality embraced by the policymakers who can choose between different 
combinations of commitment and exchange rate targets given the function/(p,.). 
This trade-off is conveyed in the derivative of (3* with respect to p in [24] and it 
gives an idea of the type of targeting strategy to adopt:
nO -
Demand shocks : _ t_> 0 ;
dp
Supply shocks: ^ _ < 0  ,V(3'>()
dp
If the policymaker’s goal is to design a target zone which minimizes 
exchange rate volatility relative to the desired target, the higher [3*, the better. On 
the contrary, if the aim is to provide exchange rate flexibility reaping the full 
benefits of coordination, the value of p which allows for the highest exchange rate 
flexibility will be chosen. According to this second criterion, a real exchange rate 
target would be the optimal choice in the case of demand shocks while for the case 
opposite supply shocks, a nominal peg would be the solution.
V l-C o n c lu s io n s .  The  n eed  f o r  f le x ib i l i t y
Welfare considerations should be the basis for any exchange rate 
arrangement among countries. Consequently, exchange rate targets which are not 
incentive compatible cannot be sustained. Given this idea we have set up a 
framework for analysing exchange rate targeting in the form of an optimal contract 
between countries which are on an equal strategic basis.
The exchange rate target is viewed as an intermediate objective. The 
policymakers in order to attain their final targets, agree on a targeting strategy 
consisting of a desired exchange rate target and their optimal commitment to it. The 
approach allows us to design simple rules which do not depend on the nature of the 
shock, but on its magnitude and this appears to be general enough to encompass 




























































































Despite this generality, targeting the exchange rate in such a way turns out 
not to be always appropiate. While for demand shocks of any type or magnitude 
an optimal contract can be devised, for supply shocks the answer depends on their 
differential impact on each country. The reason is that the optimal contract can only 
be designed when both countries are interested in moving the exchange rate in the 
same direction; this is the case of demand shocks and opposite supply shocks. Even 
in this latter case, the feasibility of the targeting strategy may be constrained by the 
structural parameters of the model.
The assumption of an identical strategic role for each country in the targeting 
strategy turns out to be a crucial feature. The resulting optimal contract allocates 
a fixed global money supply more efficiently than in a non-cooperative Nash 
situation but it does not pay when the reactions of one country exert a negative 
externality on the other country.
The following table compare our results with those of Canzoneri and 
//enderson (1991). It is interesting to make this comparison, not only because the 
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Canzoneri and Henderson consider an exchange rate target from strategically 
asymmetric perspective, where one country (the follower) pegs the exchange rate 
to the leader. The leader sets the value of its money supply to minimize its own 
welfare function and the follower only cares about maintaining the parity. Note that 
in this situation, there is no exchange rate arrangement but simply an unilateral 
exchange rate peg by the follower.
In the table we observe that this asymmetric strategy pays in the case of 
symmetric supply shocks. In this case, as it is apparent in figure 2,a. both countries 
respond by changing their money supplies in the same direction, provoking an 
overshooting of the exchange rate with respect to the efficient solution. Therefore, 
the result of a leader-follower strategy is to offset this negative externality and 
place the economy on the point H, which is optimal.
Note that in this case, the existence of a leader exerts a disciplinary effect 
on the actions of the follower because changes in the money supplies are smaller. 
Thus, when the optimal response to a shock requires a restraint or discipline in the 
management of the money supply a leader-follower strategy is desirable because 
the leader provides an anchor to the monetary policy. From the table we can 
observe that this is the only situation in which the Canzoneri-Henderson strategy 
is superior.
However, when countries act on an equal strategic basis, they can only agree 
on an optimal contract which has the same effect on the behaviour of both 
countries; in this case, no disciplinary effect can be attained. Therefore, the optimal 
contract strategy may only be beneficial when a more activist response is required. 
This implies that our alternative dominates for demand and opposite supply 
shocks9.
These results emphasize the importance of the environment to design 
exchange rate regimes. The risks of devising a targeting strategy in inappropiate 
circumstances becomes apparent. The rules and goals with which the arrangements 
were conceived may not apply in practice and the likely result is a collapse of the 
system.
9-A s we have mentioned, Canzoneri and Henderson only consider shifts in demand 
(opposite demand shocks) and common (symmetric) supply shocks. Notwithstanding this, the 




























































































The principle which has guided this research is that a more flexible approach 
to exchange rate management is advisable. In the light of the subsequent analysis, 
the advantages of flexibility are manifest.
On the one hand, there is a flexibility of response. Our outcome suggests that 
the adequate targeting strategy depends on the type of shock hitting the economy: 
in certain situations it will be convenient to adopt a leader-follower strategy; in 
others, both countries should play an equal strategic role; in this latter cases, 
sometimes it will be convenient to target the real exchange rate, in others it may 
be possible to target both, etc. Thus, a flexible approach to exchange rate targeting 
may cover most of the possible range of shocks.
On the other hand, there is a flexibility of design. We have shown that the 
trade-off between the exchange rate target and the optimal commitment to it leaves 
some room for discretion in the choice of the target to policymakers, as long as the 
optimal degree of commitment to the selected target is chosen.
We have not shown a general dominance of a nominal exchange rate target 
on a real target or vice-versa. Indeed, we have proved that in certain cases (demand 
shocks) both are valid and in others neither of them is (a wide range of supply 
shocks). Only for the case of opposite supply shocks the nominal exchange rate 
target-if any- is superior to a real exchange rate target. As we have mentioned, our 
results encompass McKinnon’s proposal because the global money supply target 
can be agreed beforehand and then allocated according to the optimal strategy, 
//owever, the choice of final targets also includes here unemployment explicitly, 
not only prices, as in MacKinnon’s formulation.
The message from this paper is then twofold:
-First, it is the economic and not the political environment which should 
determine the targeting strategy. Therefore, when the outcome of the bargaining 
process does not adjust to the economic demands the system will be inadequate and 
it is no wonder that it cannot satisfy the goals for which it was originally devised. 
This remark recognises the objective difficulties to designing optimal exchange rate 
targets.
-Second, the nature of the regime should be revised when the economic 




























































































These conclusions provide ammunition against the excessive rigidity 
envisaged in the new EMS. On the one hand, major demand shocks as German 
reunification are at odds with a nominal target plus narrow bands; The optimal 
response would have been a move to a real exchange rate target or a widening of 
the band, as the markets ultimately achieved through the crisis of 1992-93. On the 
other hand, when the emphasis shifts from exchange rate stability to inflation 
convergence to attain a Common Currency, a reflection on the adequacy of the old 
rules is in order.
It goes without saying that the convergence process needed in Europe to 
attain a common currency includes dynamic considerations which fall beyond the 
scope of this analysis. In the conclusions to the dissertation we will examine 
possible extensions to improve on this analysis and reconcile it with the previous 
work. We have also omitted the issue of policy delegation as a means by which 
conducting policy. The concept of the optimal contract is assumed in our approach 
to concern sovereign countries, tied by a commitment to respect the contract. This 
contract could also have been viewed as the constitution of a supranational Central 
Bank, which in a first stage has the responsability to monitor the behaviour of the 
exchange rate between the countries, much in the way that the European Monetary 
Institute is supposed to operate at present.
All in all, we wish to point out that in the transition to a Common Currency, 
where sound stabilization strategies are required, some sort of exchange rate 
management is clearly needed. From the analysis above, we suggest that the 
approach be flexible and adapted to the circumstances.
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This appendix shows that expectation on money supplies equal zero and 
develops the proofs to propositions one to ten.
Money supply expectations
Substituting the reduced forms in which expectations explicitly appear in the 
functions to optimize and taking the derivative with respect to the instruments, we 
obtain:
dW.
——=0 =xs(mx-m { )+r|(<j) +a)(m+(<|>+a-l)(/M1-/n1)- 
dml
- < $ > ( m 2 - m f ) + ( l - T ) x [ + T X 2- t y  ( u [ - u ' 2 ) +
+P Wp ' [("», -m f)-(m  '-m /)]+(p (u[-u2))} -  0
S W 2----- =0 =5o(/m2- w2 )+q(<j> +a)(/M+(<(> + a-l)(m 2-m 2 )-
d m 2
-<t>(/n2-/n2c)+( l-x^+Taq+^y (m2- m,)+
+ P {v P' [(w1-/w2)-(w 1<'-m2')]+(p-l)(x[-x')-Y(M;-M')} = 0
Taking expectations from these expressions, and noting that xie=uf=0, i=l,2, 
because they represent unanticipated shocks, it is straightforward to conclude that 
the expected money supplies equal zero. Setting m,e=mf=0 the reduced forms net 
of expectation which appear in [4,5] are obtained.
Proof to proposition 1 (Tareet line)
The slope of T(k) in the fm ltm2/ space is obtained by the cocient o f the 
derivatives o f the target solutions appearing in [9] with respect to X:




























































































Let us consider the different terms in equation [9]. We observe that the last 
two terms in the expressions ,and consequently their partial derivatives, are equal 
and of opposite sign.
On the contrary, the first term is different in both expressions. Let us denote 
these term as mu T,m2Ir, respectively and let us express x2 in terms of x„ x2=Kx„K 
£  R. Taking the partial derivative with respect to p of m,T(tl),m2 (tl), we get:
(1-K)(1-2t )(1+O-20)2 _ dm2,
~d>T [(l + o+ pp /)2-(20 + p p /)2]2
Therefore
dmT2/dmr ,=[ dmT2/dX] /[dmr ,/dX]=-l
Finally, from [11] the Nash solution is known to represent one point in this 
line, so that we can derive the equation of the straight line:
T(k):{(m',m2) I m J ^ - . - . - f  -m tr}
1+ 0 -2 0
Proofs to propositions 2 and 5. (Incentive compatibility)
Taking as reference the m,-axis, the slope o f the target line is equal to -1, 
so that tg(u>T)=-l, where Ior=135°,315° and a) represents the angle formed by the 
tanget line and the mr axis at the Nash point.Let us note first that the bargaining 
area, A, is formed by the area within the ellipses crossing at the Nash solution (N). 
Thus A is placed between the tangent lines to the two ellipses at N. Secondly, from 
[10,11], N is known to be a point on the target line. Therefore, as the figures 
suggest, if the target line lies between the angle formed by those two tangents: 
u>Wi<tQT<(i>Wp{iJ}=l,2, the target line will cross the bargaining area. The general 
expression for the ellipses slope at Nash point are given by:
dm21 BWfdm , (l + o)mf-2Qm2 +(1-t )x1+ta:2- (m1- u2)






























































































dW2/dml (l+o)m2 -2 0 m /+(l-x)x2+TXi+(ui-u 2)  
d W2/dm2 20 \m2 - 20m /+  (1 -x  )x2+t jc, +(«, -u j]
Let us consider first demand shocks (x,=0,x2=0). Substituting the Nash 
solution [11] into the previous expression, we obtain
dm,, n dm,, n
o (“ r “2)=00
The angles formed by these tangent lines depend on the sign o f (u,-uf). In 
particular, for the ellipse corresponding to W,:
dm.
Vupu„Lim O=*g(o) ̂ >=0
and 3 e >0 I
m,-™," dm i
N N dm,
VMr M2<0,m,e +[m, -e,m, ], =>—— ^ .,,> 0  ?





Thus Vm1- m2<0,ooh,=0°“ 360°; Vm, - h2>0, (0 ^ = 180° 
and for the second ellipse W,:
dm.
\/upu2,Lim — L . 0-  <»=> tg( w w)= oo
m,-m" dm j 2
and 3e>0 I
dm,
Vur M2<0,m2e  + [m2 -e,m2 ], =*>-—ll(nv..0<0 ;
dm 2 '
N N dm.
V«r M2>0,m2e  [m2 -s,m 2 ],=*-— 1^_0>0.
am, 2
77im s  V m ! - m 2< (),a )^  -  9 0 °  ; V u , - m 2> 0 ,<*>„,=270°
It follows then that




























































































and the target line is precisely the bisectrix o f the angle formed by the tangents to 
both ellipses. Thus, the target zone will always cross the bargaining area.# 









Applying the same reasoning, we have for W, and respectively:
j ^ - O + o - 2 0 ) ^  o°=36oo l+o-(l+q-20)T 180„
2 20+(1+o-20)t 1 ^ 2 20+(l+o-20)t 1
=90° ; ^ - ^ ^ i l l ^ I ^ L . x , = x o w=270o 
l+ o - ( l  + o-20)t ' 2 l+o-(l+a-20>t 1 w '
x,<.
-(l+a- )x
Looking at the table of parameters in the text, it is straightforward to show 
that 2Q+(1 +a-2Q)x<(l+o)-(l +a-2Q)x. Thus, the following cases arise:
V*!<0:
/ \ 20+(l+o-20)x l+ o -(l+ o -2 0 )x  , , , ,  v
(a) ,1 „  =^^(oj lv)=36°  ;/? (« )= 2 7 0l+ o -(l+ a -2 0 )x  20+(l+a-20)t 1 2
(*) x2> -  =*g( co *)-180°; tg( co ̂ -2 7 0 °
20+(l+o-20)t 1 2











^ ( c o lv)=180°;rg(a)lv)-270°
r/ius, the target zone constitutes the bisectrix of the angle formed by the 
tangents to both ellipses in cases labelled (a); for the rest of cases, the target line 
is perpendicular to the bisectrix and consequently are ruled out. The range of 

































































































( l+ a )-( l+ a -2 0 )r
jct => 3X I rp o ru
Proof o f propositions 3 and 6 (Pareto optimal points)
Let us consider the bliss line B, instead of the contract curve, since the latter 
is too complex to work with. As a previous step, it is claimed that if the target line 
intersects the bliss line it also implies intersects the contract curve. We prove this 
claim as follows.
Since the contract curve, the target line and the bliss line are continuous and 
differentiable, we can express:
m2c=f(b) as a function of m,c=g(b): m2c=f(g '(m,<)=C (m f ) 
m f= f’(k) as a function o f m,T=g’(k): m2T=f’(g’,(mlT)=T(m,r) 
m2 as a function o fm ,B: m B=B(mB)
Then the lemma below, based on the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem can be 
directly applied and our claim is proved.
The coordinates for which T=B are now found for the two different types 
of shocks. The intersection between T and B is obtained by equating expressions 
[10j and [13].
For demand shocks (xi=0,x2=0), we get
T  Bmx =mx =■1 ur u 2
2 20
T  B;m2 =m2 = 1 “ r “ 2
2 20
which corresponds precisely to the middle point of the bliss line. Thus, in the case 
of demand shocks the target line will always cross the contract curve.
The resolution is more complex when supply shocks hit the economies 
(u,=0,u2=0). Equating the target and bliss lines, the solution is given by 
T B (l+o'pci+2Qx2 x(x2-x[) ( l-x )x 2+xxx
T  B  rm2 =m2 =[
20(1+0-20) 20 (1—2t )(jc2- jc1)
(1+o )x2+20a:1 (1 -x )x x+x x 2




























































































where it is not straightforward to ascertain whether this point falls within the 
relevant segment o f the bliss line. Thus, all the possible combinations of supply 
shocks are examined to obtain the range o f shocks which make the target line to 
intersect the bliss segment. The solution turns out to be given by the following 
range:
Vx>o,ij** i  ,2,/vy,
( l+ a ) - ( l+ o - 2 0 ) t^  ^ 20+(l+o-20)r
1 20+(l+o-20)t X^ X’’S‘ ( l+ o )- ( l+ a -2 0 )r^
=>3X,5 I T(k)=C(b)
the same than above#
Lemma (Bolzano-Weierstrass)
The lines C(b) and B have at least two common points at 6=0, b=l.Then, 
if3m,'\ T(k)=B ^3m,'\T(X)=C(b).
PROOF: The claim is that3m, \ (T-C)m, =0.
Adding and substracting B, we get (T-B+B-C )m,
Let us assume that3m, \B(m,)=T(m,)=m2.
Recall that C(0)=B:>C(1)=BI so that (C -B)m,BI=(C -B)m,B2=0.
Since B^B, are the extremes of the bliss line, this implies that if
B(mB')=C (mBl)>T'(mi'),B(mB,)=C'(mBl)< T \m B,),iJ={l,2},i*j 
it follows that
3 m l{\Cl(m")=Tl(m{)
by Bolzano-Weierstrass, and the lemma is proved #.
Proof of proposition 4 (and 7). (Optimal and incentive compatible points)
From [10], we observe that the m f - - m f  on the target line in the absence 
of supply shocks. Substituting m, for -m2 in the first order conditions of the 
cooperative solution (which correspond to the left-side term and right-side term of 
the expression for C(b) in [12]) and substituting 2, for the respective values, the 




























































































[ô(l+o)+(l-ô)(20)2+20]/n,7=(ô +(1- ô)20)(m1- m2); 
[(l-ô)(l+a)+ô(20)2+20]/M1r=(ô20+(l-ô))(«1-M2)
Given the demand shocks, this is a non-linear system in b and m,T. However, 
we showed that T intersects the bliss line at the middle point; this suggest that a 
reasonable value for solving the system is b=l/2. Substituting this guess above, it 
is immediate to see that b=l/2 satisfy both equations. The Pareto optimal point on 
the target line is then given by:
Substituting N and C(l/2) in the loss functions, the welfare loss is 
obtained:
and consequently the Pareto optimal point is incentive compatible. #
Proof of proposition 8 (Positive externality)






Vx>Oqcf$.[- l+ a -(l+ a -2 0 )x  v _ 20+(l+a-20)x r ]  ,_t ,  
20+(l+a-20)x l + a-(l+ o -2 0 )i: ~ ’
=>sign(m,N)=sign(mJN)
=*sign{m?ysign(m/ )




























































































Note that the first case covers just the range of values for which neither 
optimal nor incentive compatible exchange targeting strategies can be devised and 
other two cases conveyed the range o f shocks for which propositions 2-7 apply. 
Thus, the proposition is proved #
Proof o f propositions 9 and 10
Exchange rate deviations appear in [5]. Substituting the Nash [11] and 
optimal solutions [18,19] for the values o f the instruments, the expressions to 
compare are expressed in function o f the shocks. Rearranging terms, we can write, 
in the case of demand shocks:
[z-z‘t]N=2( J Z L
l+a+20 ----? = ) ( « , -u 2)2^v'r|
[z-z*]-- 2[ vP' (1-26) 1 7](“ r “2)
o+(l +20)2 2 t , \ J r \ ~ '
and, when the shock arise in the supply side (opposite shocks):
[ z -z T =  
[z-z*]-— 2[-
. - y Vp' (1~2t ) _ p - t / Ç . 
i+o+20
2vpr '(l + 20)(l-2T)_p-T/Ç  
o+(l+20)2 /r T ]*■
From these expressions, where we note that only source of divergence is the 
term in brackets, we can deduct the sign of p sustracting the optimal strategy from 
the Nash strategy. I f  the result is positive this is indication that P is posiive.
Let us start by considering the demand shocks. After consulting the 
parameter table, we can see that this term is negative in both expressions. 
However, the first term in the brackets is less than one for the considered range 
of p, and the second larger than one and it is straightforward to show that the 
Nash solution in absolute value is larger than the optimal targeting solution. Thus, 
for demand shocks:




























































































The outcome is not so straightforward for opposite supply shocks because 
p appears both in the numerator o f the first and second term. However, operating 
and simplifying, the following condition for a positive p can be derived:
V p a p '= ----------—----- ---- >0 =d(z-z‘,);vl>l(2-z‘i)*l=^>0
l+20+_2_-W rj1-20 ,
where we have made use o f 2Q=(\r|)<j>. Given the values of the parameters, it 
follows that real exchange targets produce negative p and that, for reasonable 
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